to leave his quarrel with the poets entirely behind; the problem of the epistemic claims of poetry makes an appearance in the Apology and reappears in almost a dozen subsequent dialogues. Even after what might seem to be his final word on the matter (in Book X of the Republic) the problematic status of poetry is reconsidered and appears in what is probably his latest extant work, the Laws.
Despite the resilience of the 'problem of poetry' in Plato's corpus, only one early dialogue, the Ion, addresses it head-on and takes it as its central theme. Despite being Plato's shortest early dialogue, it is structurally complex. While the first part of the Ion is typical of early dialogues, in terms of both its limited scope of discussion and its style, the dialogue ends with a clear and definite answer to the questions raised at its beginning, that is, what the rhapsode, Ion -a performer and interpreter of Homer -knows and does not know, and what explains the undeniable allure of his performances. Thus, unlike Plato's other early dialogues, the Ion does not appear to leave the reader with an aporia. Another unusual feature of the Ion is the style of argument in the second part of the dialogue. Instead of developing Socrates' dialogical dispute with the rhapsode, Plato here offers a long, discursive soliloquy by Socratesa narrative monologue more typical of the middle or late dialogues. I will argue that these stylistic and structural features are not mere idiosyncrasies, but derive from an important feature of the dialogue's substance, namely, Plato's ambivalence about the value of poetic discourse. This ambivalence, moreover, is perhaps evidenced in the Ion more clearly than in any other dialogue, in two ways. First, unlike the Republic, the Ion does not attempt to impugn the truth of beliefs either embodied in or produced by poetry. For all that is said in the Ion, there is no reason to doubt the beliefs poetry delivers and very good reason to accept them. The Ion does not address the justification of such beliefs; indeed (if we assume the veracity of divine sources), their justificatory credentials are unimpeachable. But an unresolved worry remains, and this is the topic and the driving force of Plato's dialogue and the source of his ambivalence: while the insights of the poets may be both true and justified, the way in which we come to endorse them undermines the very condition under which we can ourselves achieve wisdom: rational agency. The rhapsode is not unlike the psychotic whose delusions happen to be true. Perhaps he is not being deceived, but neither does he know anything. The Ion thus illuminates a kind of conundrum, I believe, which ultimately eluded Plato's best attempts at resolution: the tension between poetry's poor epistemic credentials on the one hand, and its evident power, on the other hand, to compel belief with a force rivalling the logic of philosophical dialectic. Poetry can deliver true beliefs, and these beliefs may even be justified. But the way in which we access poetry's messages requires a sacrifice: the possessed rhapsode is no longer master of his soul but 'inspired and out of his senses, and reason is no longer in him' (534b).
